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How Lawyers Should Address
the Court’s New Emphasis

T

he Michigan Supreme Court said almost exactly that in Gilbert v DaimlerChrysler
Corp.1 The plaintiff recovered a $21 million verdict in her sexual harassment suit.
‘‘She contended during her trial that defendant’s failure to deal adequately with
sexual harassment in her plant led to a permanent change in her ‘brain chemistry’
and a relapse into substance abuse and depression, and that these conditions will soon lead
to her untimely and excruciating death.’’2 The foundation for this theory of recovery was
laid by a social worker called to the stand by the plaintiff.
The social worker had apparently studied the plaintiff’s hospital records and was asked several questions on direct examination, including:
Q. Will [plaintiff ] be able to work in light of what you know about her condition as recently as
yesterday? Will she continue to be physically able to work?
A. No. Her medical complications at this point have progressed to the point where she is going to
be physically unable to work fairly soon.
***
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In the world of modern trials, expert
witnesses are the coin of the realm.
Lawyers know that most of the
time, experts are case-breakers.
Their demeanor, knowledge, and
presentation ability are key qualities.
Accordingly, their persuasive effect
on modern lay jurors makes it
incumbent on judges to ensure
that an expert’s opinions are
appropriately directed. That means
not allowing an economist to
testify about the medical dynamics
of bone disease, for example.
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Fast Fact:
Q. Do you have any idea what was the cause
of her problems as they exist in this lady
as late as yesterday?
A. Alcoholism, major depression precipitated
by work stresses, and sexual harassment.
That is the bottom line.3

The use of a social worker to provide what
the Court saw as medical conclusions was
held to be error. ‘‘The medical ‘prognosis’ of
a social worker who has no training in medicine and lacks any demonstrated ability to
interpret medical records meaningfully is of
little assistance to the trier of fact.’’4

Life After Gilbert
The gatekeeping responsibility imposed
on judges by Gilbert has been robustly interpreted by the appellate courts. In 2005, the
court of appeals found that the trial court
failed to properly exercise its function as the
gatekeeper of expert opinion testimony. The
trial court erred when it ruled on the admissibility of evidence ‘‘without either conducting a more searching inquiry under its obligation to preclude speculative and unreliable
evidence,’’ or holding a hearing regarding the
acceptance of an expert’s theories.5 Gilbert
was cited as requiring trial courts to ensure
that any expert testimony admitted at trial
is reliable. The court of appeals added that
‘‘‘[c]areful vetting of all aspects of expert testimony is especially important when an expert provides testimony about causation,’ ’’
again relying on Gilbert.6
Gilbert is also having an impact in other
jurisdictions. The Tennessee Court of Appeals cited it for the proposition that when
an ‘‘expert relies on unreliable foundational
data, any opinion drawn from that data is
likewise, unreliable.’’7 ‘‘By the same token, an
expert’s testimony is unreliable, even when
the underlying data is sound, if the expert
employed flawed methodology or applied
sound methodology in a flawed way.’’8

Lawyer Directions
In order to comply with Gilbert and Michigan Rule of Evidence 702, an attorney presenting an expert must be able to establish
these factors:
• The data underlying the expert’s testimony is substantial and trustworthy.
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In the fast-paced world of expert testimony, the rules are
changing rapidly. To help lawyers keep pace, the authors of
this article concisely summarize new guidelines imposed
by the courts. Practical advice accompanies the legal points,
with suggestions for presenting an expert in court as well
as for blunting objections to his testimony.
• The manner in which the expert interprets and extrapolates from that data is
reasonable and sound.
• Any opinion based on the data expresses
conclusions reached through reliable
principles and methodology.
• The expert is qualified to provide opinions that are within the scope of the individual’s expertise.
Lawyers also need to appreciate that MRE
702 and 703 were recently amended, as ably
explained by Ronald Longhoffer in the October 2004 Michigan Bar Journal.9 Since many
attorneys practice in both state and federal
courts, it is imperative that they understand
where federal rules and MRE provisions
mirror each other and where they deviate.
The two amended expert witness rules illustrate. MRE 702 tracks FRE 702. Accordingly, Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc 10 and its progeny provide guideposts
for both state and federal courts.
MRE 703 is different. Michigan law deviates remarkably from the federal pattern of
FRE 703. While experts in federal court can
base their conclusions on out-of-court reports and documents, they cannot in Michigan. An expert propounding opinions in a
Michigan courtroom must base those opinions on facts or data that are admitted in evidence at trial.

Judicial Double Duty
The foregoing feature of MRE 703 imposes a duty on Michigan judges that is not
shared by their federal counterparts. Michigan jurists must, in addition to the gatekeeping function mentioned earlier, be sure that
the expert’s underlying data is all in evidence,
at least when an objection to the expert’s
opinion is made on this ground.
Sometimes this extra burden in Michigan
prompts counsel to peruse the exceptions to
the hearsay rule with more than normal cu-

riosity. Since experts often rely on written
hearsay documents, avenues for admissibility
must be explored. Counsel might look hard
at the business records, public records, market reports, and vital statistics exceptions for
assistance, as well as the admissions doctrine.11 This process is especially crucial when
some of the expert’s information base includes reports prepared by other nontestifying experts or testing labs. If all else fails,
counsel might endeavor to accommodate
such reports under the open-ended (residual)
exception to the hearsay rule.

Criminal Cases
In the criminal case scenario, a special
challenge to prosecutors has been posed by
the 2004 decision of the United States Supreme Court in Crawford v Washington.12
That case requires defense cross-examination
of the authors of documents used against a
defendant. This is probably also true if documents are offered in evidence simply for the
purpose of providing the background for
opinions of prosecution experts. The point
becomes critical in cases in which the expert
did not personally prepare the document
used against the defendant. Thus, the preparer is not before the court; however, the
preparer’s work product is present in the form
of test results, a chemist’s report, or other
similar documents. Such documentation does
not appear to escape Crawford ’s reach, which
fails to include an exception for expert data.
As long as the document is ‘‘testimonial,’’ its
author must appear for cross-examination.13
Could prosecutors argue that the standard
for such cross-examination should be relaxed
if the only use of the document is to illustrate
the basis for the prosecution expert’s conclusions? After all, the prosecution expert is in
court, ready for cross-examination. Presumably that argument could be made, but the
Crawford decision has not yet been interpreted

Practice Pointer
Whether a case is civil or criminal, it will
often be the party’s expert who lays the foundation for his or her own opinion by mentioning the facts, test results, or other data
that he or she prepared and consulted on the
way to reaching a conclusion. After placing
these well-selected facts into the record, the
foundation is laid to request the expert’s opinion. An opponent may interject a technical
objection at this point. In a medical case, the
objection might take the form of challenging
whether physicians customarily rely on such
data to reach conclusions, for example. If sustained, the direct examiner needs to be ready
with the following question: ‘‘Doctor, are
these the sort of facts and data that experts in
your field regularly and reasonably rely on to
reach clinical conclusions?’’ An affirmative
answer to that question lays the groundwork
for the statement of the expert’s opinion.

Issues for the Future

of MRE 702, but Michigan courts seem to
be vigorously working to shape a code of expert witness law for future guidance. ♦
Brian Benner is an active
trial lawyer with Benner
& Bilicki in Farmington Hills.
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A host of unpublished 2005 Michigan
appellate opinions underline the point that
trial courts are grappling with varying situations involving application of the Gilbert
standards. In one, the proposed testimony of
an infectious disease expert was rejected.14 In
another, the trial court allowed the testimony
of a forensic interviewer as an expert witness
on the common characteristics of children
who allege sexual abuse.15 These and related
decisions all involve the issue of whether the
trial court abused its discretion in admitting
or excluding evidence under the factors outlined in Gilbert. That sort of analysis is likely
to continue as appellate courts shape Michigan evidence law around the principle of
eliminating junk science, while retaining
sound and reliable expert proof.

Whether a case is civil or criminal, it will often
be the party’s expert who lays the foundation
for his or her own opinion by mentioning the facts,
test results, or other data that he or she prepared
and consulted on the way to reaching a conclusion.
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by the high court to allow such a relaxation of
regular cross-examination rules.

Conclusion
This is an exciting time in the development of Michigan expert witness law. MRE
702 and 703 are at the center of this development. The intersection of evidentiary rules
like MRE 703 and the cross-examination requirements of Crawford v Washington is still
to be mapped out. So are the full parameters
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